Safety Case
- Safety Case
- the safety work product
that provides clear, comprehensive, defensible, and written justification for believing
that a potentially-dangerous system will be (or is) acceptably safe
when operated in its intended environment over the its lifetime from inception to eventual retirement
As illustrated in the preceding figure, Safety Case is part of the following inheritance hierarchy:
- Type: Concrete
- Superclass: Document
- Subclasses:
The typical responsibilities of a Safety Case are to document:
- Complete and consistent claims that a system will be (or is) adequately safe:
- That safety requirements are sufficient and met.
- That the safety integrity levels (SILs) for hazards are sufficiently low.
- That any residual safety risks are sufficiently low.
- For each safety claim, compelling arguments that it will be (or is being) met.
- For each argument, sufficient supporting evidence and acceptable
assumptions exist to justify accepting the argument.
- A safety case demonstrates that:
- All hazards have been properly identified, analyzed,
and where necessary mitigated.
- Any residual safety risks are acceptable.
- The system meets its safety requirements (i.e., the claims).
- The process used to develop the safety requirements, produce the system, and assess the system were carried out
with adequate integrity.
- A safety case requires an organisation to think of all aspects of safety.
- A safety case frequently exposes previously unidentified safety issues.
- A safety case demonstrates that an organisation has taken ownership of its responsibility for ensuring safety.
- A safety case enables safety assessors and evaluators to determine if there is sufficient evidence
that a system is adequately safe.
- Preparation and delivery of a safety case is typically required to meet the developer’s contractual or
regulatory requirements.
- A safety case provides some legal protection from prosecution in case of an accident.
The typical contents of a safety case are:
- System Overview:
- System Description
- Configuration Baseline
- Safety Risks:
- Overview of Potential Accidents
- Overview of Hazards
- Overview of Residual Safety Risks
- Safety Claims:
- Summary of Safety Requirements
- Safety Claim X:
- Statement of Safety Claim X
- Relevant Hazards
- Residual Safety Risks
- Relevant Safety Requirements
- Safety Arguments:
- Summary of the Safety Arguments
- Safety Argument Y:
- Statement of Safety Argument Y
- Supporting Evidence:
- Development Process including Safety
Evidence Assurance Levels (SEALs)
- Requirements Evidence (e.g., formal
specification language, evaluations)
- Architecture Evidence (e.g.,
architectural safeguards and mechanisms,
evaluations)
- Design Evidence (e.g., design
safeguards, design standards,
evaluations)
- Implementation Evidence (e.g.,
implementation safeguards, coding
standards, safe language subsets,
evaluations)
- Integration Evidence
- Testing Evidence
- Deployment Evidence
- Operations Evidence
- Maintenance Evidence
- Retirement Evidence
- Supporting Assumptions
- Appendices:
- Applicable Regulations, Laws, Certifications and
Standards
- Major Issues
- TBDs
- Assumptions
The typical stakeholders of a safety case are:
- Producer:
- Evaluators:
- Approvers:
- Maintainers:
- Users:
- Customer
- Legal Department
- Safety Assessor, who monitors performance of the
safety engineering process and acts as an arbitrater in
cases of disputes between the customer and development
organizations.
- Safety Evaluator, who provides a thorough,
independent, and objective review of the validity of the
safety case.
- Safety Certifier, who:
- Assesses the safety and suitability for service of
the system
- Certifies the system as safe for service
A safety case typically can be started if the following
preconditions hold:
A safety case typically has the following inputs:
- Work Products:
- Stakeholders:
Guidelines
- The safety case may consist of one or more documents and
associated data.
- The safety case should be clear, consistent, complete,
comprehensible (to all stakeholders), and defensible.
- To provide a clear and understandable structure, safety
cases should be organized:
- Safety claim
- Safety argument
- Safety evidence and assumptions
- Tool support for the development and maintenance of
safety cases is very helpful because they tend to be very
large and complex with numerous complex internal
interdependencies due to the:
- Complex nature of safety-critical systems
- The large number and variety of safety analyses
performed
- The large amount of safety-related data used as
evidence
- Safety evidence may be included in the safety case by
reference to data in the
Safety Compliance Repository
- Diagrams may be useful for getting an overview of the
safety case. Examples include using
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which was developed for
depicting safety arguments.
- The safety case should cover all relevant stages of the
system’s lifecycle including development,
manufacturing, deployment, operation, and retirement.
- Safety cases should be incrementally developed and
delivered at different times during development:
- A preliminary safety case at the end of preliminary
hazard analysis
- An interim safety case at the end of the inception
phase
- An operational safety case at just prior to system
acceptance
- A safety case should be a living document that is
updated, reviewed, and delivered:
- On a regular basis (e.g., before each major
milestone)
- When new hazards are identified and analyzed
- When safety incidents (i.e., accident or near miss)
occur
- A safety case should include all aspects of systems and
operations including such “soft” but important
issues as management, human safety performance, procedures
and organisation, and safety culture.
The safety case is typically constrained by the following
conventions:
-
Content and Format Standard
-
MS Word Template
-
XML DTD
-
Evaluation Checklist